A Utilitarian Theory of Justice

Justice is a concept that often defies definition, and there are many conceptions of it. A libertarian view emphasizes freedom from coercion, while distributive or social justice seeks equality. Here I will use a strictly defined desert theory of justice and try to show how it fits in with a utilitarian ethical system. Justice, as I will define it, is centered on the idea of balance, not necessarily equality, of the distribution of goods. One can obtain something by putting forth the effort with that goal in mind, in which case the individual deserves to gain the intended benefit. Thus inequalities can result based on the behaviors of the individual agents while still maintaining justice. Injustice occurs when goods are not distributed according to desert. Injustice can be positive or negative. Positive injustice occurs when someone obtains a good without having put forth the effort to deserve it. An example of this would be finding a treasure in a field or accidentally striking oil on one’s land. Negative injustice occurs when someone does put forth the effort, but does not obtain the deserved benefit. An example of this is climatic crop failure after a year of working the land. An individual who does nothing deserves neither to gain nor lose, and his status should remain neutral. I believe this definition of justice captures the various intuitive feelings we have about the concept. We do indeed have a sense of social justice, in which we think it unfair that some are born into wealth, while others are born into poverty. In fact, for the world to be completely just, according to my definition, all agents should start out equal in every respect. Since we do not, we rightly have this sense of social injustice in the world. Yet we also have a sense that an individual who has earned a good through effort should not have it taken away to give to others who have not made the effort. When we consider justice to concern the starting conditions of all agents in the moral community, this definition of justice captures both intuitive senses of justice fairly well.
If justice is a desert-based system for distributing goods, then what constitutes these goods? Material wealth, knowledge, possibly certain virtues, or a number of things could be distributed along the lines of desert. Since I am working with a utilitarian theory of ethics, I will consider all these things to be merely incidental to the goal of achieving happiness. Therefore I will consider the ultimate good to be distributed justly to be happiness or utility itself. I will return to this in a moment. For now, I also want to distinguish justice from pure ethics. The goal of utilitarian ethics is to maximize happiness (or utility) for the most individuals. Whatever works to achieve this is considered to be moral. Utilitarianism disregards justice as an end in of itself. In fact, ideally, utility would be distributed along the lines of positive injustice as I described it earlier. Nevertheless, including a sense of justice with utilitarianism can better elucidate the realm of moral experience.

Every event with moral weight involves at least one agent. Such events will have consequences involving both utility and justice. An event with moral weight involving only one agent occurs when impersonal forces at play in the universe cause some change in utility to an individual. He may become more happy or less happy, and by that criterion we can judge the event to be good or bad. At the same time, that increase in happiness can be deserved or undeserved, and thus be unjust, either positively or negatively so. Events involving one or more agents acting on one or more other agents become more complex, as it is necessary to consider the changes in utility and justice status for both. In carrying out the action, the acting agent has an expectation of how it will change the level of utility in himself and in the agent that he is acting on. (Note: It has been suggested that all agents expect their actions to increase their own utility, that is, to want to do something means that one inherently believes doing so will make one happier. Since this theory is non-falsifiable, I will assume that it is at least theoretically possible for an agent to carry out an action that he believes will actually decrease his utility.) There are also to be considered the actual changes in utility in the acting agent and the affected agent. Sometimes there may also be a secondary event wherein the acting agent perceives the reaction of the affected agent, which in turn could change the level of his own utility. Let us consider each part individually.

When the acting agent derives utility from the event at an amount different than what he expected to derive from it, it is because he had imperfect knowledge of the situation. This imperfect knowledge can be attributed to a bundle of causal chains emanating from the beginning of the universe and snaking in an out of his being. I will better explain that statement later. For now, it is sufficient to say that the universe is responsible for the discrepancy. This difference is the level of injustice of utility that the acting agent now has with regard to the universe. It is positive injustice if he gained more utility than he expected, and negative injustice if he gained less than expected. Negative or positive injustice is also applicable if he expected to lose utility in carrying out the action (suppose carrying it out involved considerable physical strain, for instance). It can be said that he now owes the universe a measure of utility, or that the universe owes him, for this discrepancy.

As for the affected agent, the event may cause a change in utility within himself. If he gains utility, it can be said that he has incurred “utility debt” to the acting agent, since he was immediately responsible for the event. If he has instead suffered as a result, and therefore has lost utility, then the acting agent has incurred “utility debt”, which he now owes. I believe this concept of utility debt captures the spirit of the obligation an individual often feels to do something positive for another person who has benefited him. However, there is more to it. One criticism of utilitarianism is that it takes no consideration of intentions. By taking the concept of utility justice one step further, I believe it is possible to address this. One must remember that the acting agent may also have an expectation of the change in the level of utility of the affected agent. To expect that it will increase is to have good intentions, to expect it to decrease is to have bad intentions, and to have no expectations is to have no intention with regard to morals. When the affected agent’s utility is changed by the event, there may be a discrepancy between the expected effect and the actual effect. Because the acting agent sought to change the affected agent’s utility only to the level he expected, that is the level of desert the acting agent has as regards the actualization of the event, and therefore that is the amount of utility debt incurred. The difference between the expected level of utility and the actual level also represent a utility debt. However, this debt is incurred by the universe, since it was impersonal unforeseen forces in the universe that were responsible for the discrepancy. Perhaps breaking it down makes this clearer. Suppose an acting agent expects his action to cause and increase of three hedons (theoretical units of pleasure—as of yet we cannot truly quantify it) of utility in the affected agent, but the actual level of utility increases by five hedons. The affected agent now has a utility debt to the acting agent, but only as much as the acting agent anticipated the increase in utility to be. The remaining two hedons are the responsibility of the universe, and so those fall into the category of a sort of “karmic debt” owed by the affected agent to the universe. The formula is simply expected utility minus actual utility equal karmic debt (or credit). In this case, 3h – 5h = -2h. If the expected increase in utility was less than the actual, then the affected agent owes the expected amount to the acting agent, but the universe in turn owes the affected agent the difference (5h – 3h = 2h in karmic credit owed by the universe to the affected agent). If the actual change in utility was exactly what was expected, then nothing is owed the universe. Suppose the acting agent’s intent was actually to decrease the level of utility for the affected agent (bad intentions). In the case where the expectation was a large decrease in utility but the reality was a smaller decrease, the same formula applies, only now it is the acting agent who owes the affected agent, with the difference being owed the universe by the affected agent: (-5)h – (-3)h = -2h. If the utility in the affected agent decreased more than was expected, then the difference is owed by the universe to the affected agent: (-3)h – (-5)h = 2h in karmic credit.

I justify this hedonistic calculus because we do have a sense that intention matters in some way on ethical matters, yet in a purely utilitarian sense, it does not matter. We do not treat accidental manslaughter the same way as murder in a court of law, yet we recognize the very real suffering caused by a death in both cases. The idea of the universe owing utility debt to us or that we might somehow owe utility debt to the universe may at first sound absurd. Yet, we can feel angry at the world in general or at no one in particular because of unfortunate circumstances we happen to be in. Likewise, we have the idea of luck, that is, favorable circumstances that we cannot attribute to any particular person. Though it is only by luck that we could ever hope to be repaid by the universe and we can never actually repay the universe what we owe, the concept of the universe as a debtor or creditor captures the reality of our experience and helps clarify degrees of responsibility. I justify dividing responsibility for the gain or loss in utility between the acting agent and the universe at the point of expected change from a compatibilist view of determinism. All events, including those commonly attributed to free will by acting agents, are, in reality, determined by the laws of physics. Robust free will is an incoherent concept and could not exist in the world as we know it. However, it is difficult to build a system of ethics upon a deterministic universe. Therefore it is helpful to draw the line at some point where the chains of cause and effect are largely contained within an individual mind and attribute moral responsibility to actions originating primarily from within that mind. It is ultimately arbitrary where that line is drawn, since everything making up an individual’s mind eventually originates from causes outside his being. Genetics, environment, and upbringing are just a few of the groupings of billions of chains of cause and effect to which we often attribute the actions of an individual. There may be something we call a will, but it is not free. The brain is a decision-making machine, but can only make decisions based on the information that is available to it and its choices are limited by its own inherent ability and immediate circumstances. Nevertheless, it works the best it can using imperfect knowledge. I work with the assumption that if the acting agent had known all the forces at work in the event and had a perfectly rational mind, then the actual result of his actions would be exactly what he expected. Therefore any discrepancy between the two is the result of forces in the universe of which the acting agent had insufficient knowledge and/or preconditions in the mind to which we cannot hold the agent accountable, or, in short, the universe itself.

There are some consequences and caveats if we accept this view of justice and utility. One is that an acting agent also may or may not receive feedback from the affected agent as to his change in utility. The perception of a discrepancy between intended and actual change may itself cause changes in the utility of the acting agent. There may also be several related actions in quick succession. In order to determine by whom and to whom utility debt is owed, it may be necessary to break down the whole series of actions into individual actions to see where debt is incurred and where it is cancelled out. There are also implications in regard to the idea of punishment and reward. From a utilitarian standpoint, I think it is best to resist the urge to advocate any kind of punishment by converting lost hedons into dolors (units of pain). Repaying lost hedons with dolors, as in the case of punishing an acting agent may in a sense cancel his utility debt to the affected agent (thus eliminating injustice between the two agents), but only if no other agent is involved in carrying out the punishment. Punishment in of itself also does nothing to restore lost utility (utility has decreased in both parties, but equally), nor does it recognize whatever debt or credit the universe may have. In any case, it is the goal of utilitarianism to increase utility regardless of justice. It is only because recognition of injustice (a sense of unfairness in the world and in the deeds of others) incidentally has the effect of often decreasing utility that feel a need to place it somewhere in the realm of ethics. With the system I have described, we can recognize its role in ethics. Individuals who have earned utility credit from increasing the utility of others have a right or a just claim to more utility, while those who have done the opposite are ones on whom others have a just claim to demand that they increase their utility. It is only necessary from a purely ethical standpoint to recognize justice inasmuch as satisfying justice tends to lead to utility whereas injustice tends to lead to less utility.

There is one type of person who is best suited to live in the ethical realm. It is one who forgives any utility debt owed to him by others or by the universe, and who gains utility from increasing the utility of others. Such a saint would always try to increase the happiness of others and in doing so make himself happier, while at the same time never being saddened by things that would normally cause one to be unhappy. This altruistic stoic is one whom we should all strive to emulate.