i see no reason to think that any objective moral system is written into the fabric of the universe in the same way that the laws of physics are. a useful approach to the questions of why have them or how do we come to create them is to see things from a biological perspective and view morals as the product of evolution. i once had to write a paper concerning the "ring of gyges" from plato's republic. i tried to argue that even if one had superhuman powers that enabled one to get away with anything one wanted without being caught, one should still act morally. but the best i could come up with was that if somehow those powers ceased or lapsed such that one was caught, one could not reasonably expect to be treated very nicely or morally after having done so many bad things. this answer wasn't satisfactory. the biological approach is probably the most correct, though not the most inspiring. it may also get around the "is-ought" problem. in order to best ensure immortality, bits of DNA developed ways of producing machines that would copy them billions of times over, and even mix and match them with other bits of DNA, providing them with a variety of organismal homes in which to weather the vicissitudes of an unstable climate. at first glance, it would seem that a living organism should grab all the resources it can to give itself the best survival odds. but it would compete with other organisms trying to do the same. thus the result is not always a net gain; you take stuff from other people, but you too are liable to have your stuff taken away as well. from this alone one can already see the categorical imperative coming. if one did indeed have godlike powers that surpassed that of other potential competitors, one "should" in fact act in a decidedly evil and selfish way. what i mean by "should" is that the individual is a product of evolution and as a result will have a natural disposition to seek its own (or rather its genes') advantage (unless some mutation causes otherwise). seeking that advantage is what the organism does by its very nature, which can roughly translate into "should". however, even with those powers, the individual would still have also evolved certain "nice" and "selfless" behavioral tendencies, the result of millions of years of having to live with competitors and to care for its offspring, who are the carriers of its genes to immortality. thus we also have a naturally ingrained (again barring any weird mutations) ability to empathize with others and inclination to care for others. thus one "should" also act virtuously, even if one had the ring of gyges or other remarkable advantages over one's competitors. caring is also what we do. so, we have in ourselves both the inclinations toward altruism and egoism. and since we don't have the ring of gyges, acting totally immoral would not give us any net gain because it would cause others who are also seeking their own advantage to act likewise toward us.
the bottom line is that yes, some sense of morality is built into our brains, but so is the drive for personal gain. the result is a game of give and take, in which we navigate our way between selfish and altruistic behavior. as the human brain's evolution accelerated, we created more complex societies, and these same selfish and altruistic tendencies were translating into the laws and moral codes of those societies. thus we do work together most of the time--each new day is not a battle to the death with our neighbors and we can usually gain more as individuals when we work together. yet within that usually outwardly cooperative framework, individuals are all still seeking their own advantage, and will sometimes harm others in the process. societies naturally try to reinforce the tendencies in man toward altruism (religions, laws, and unwritten rules of behavior; incidentally, recognition of ingrained selfishness is built into some societies' moral codes in the form of "natural" rights), but will still not stop all individuals from acting to benefit themselves to the detriment of others. thus crime, warfare, and oppression have been consistent themes in history. unfortunately, accident makes the world unjust. some have certain advantages over others, whether it be strength, technology, access to positions of power. those advantages bring a person a little closer to gyges and give them less incentive to be nice. if naturally selected drives to do good within an individual and societal reinforcement of those drives are not strong enough to overcome the also naturally selected drive for selfishness, then that individual will act immorally, that is, in a manner harmful toward others when in suits him.
some possible corollaries:
-there is no "correct" ethical theory to be derived from reason, so utilitarianism, the categorical imperative, and other ethical theories are artificial constructs that try to encapsulate behaviors that have come about through natural selection, typically favoring the more altruistic, empathetical side of human nature. we also evolved to regard virtue and morality highly because usually cooperation benefits both parties involved to a greater extent than competition (as in the prisoner's dilemma). this helps to keep us moral for the most part and not hobbesian brutes most of the time.
-if more people acting virtuously results in a larger net gain for all involved and really nasty competition to a lesser net gain, then it should be in the advantage of all except possibly the very powerful to promote virtue in themselves and their associates. the requires better reinforcement of such qualities and possibly even that a better future world would require the sexualization of virtue (ie: make nice=sexy and mean=unattractive so that sexual selection will more closely resemble moral assessment, thus shifting the gene pool to a more moral genotype. though this would probably not naturally occur, since even sexual selection is also subject to selfishness)
-death is utility neutral, but we fear it anyway because we have evolved the tendency toward self-preservation. this would then probably be a factor in the ethical systems our societies try to promote. negative utilitarianism can run into this issue and conclude that all life should be ended immediately in a painless manner.
-the whole situation might be reminiscent of straussian noble lies
Saturday, June 16, 2007
Friday, May 11, 2007
Against Rule Utilitarianism
Here’s why I think act utilitarianism is better than rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism assumes that: (1) in most cases a rule maximizes utility and (2) in exceptional cases wherein the rule does not maximize utility, the rule should be followed because: (a) people may not realize the exceptional nature of a particular case and cite the incident as a precedent for breaking the rule generally and (b) reinforcement of the rule in the long run maximizes utility more than breaking the rule in exceptional cases. A and B are arguable. Reasonable people should be able to recognize extreme situations that test the limits of such rules. It is also conceivable that at some point circumstances might change enough so that some of the rules no longer maximize utility. Act utilitarianism, I believe covers the same ground as rule utilitarianism because the consequences of an example of breaking a “rule” would be taken into consideration in the utility calculations. Act utilitarianism remains true to the consequentialist basis of utilitarianism (that consequences are what matters) without establishing any hard and fast rules that might become so ingrained in the conscience that the system of rules itself replaces the notion of utility as the basis for morals. A weak or “provisional” form of rule utilitarianism might be acceptable so long as the consequentialist basis of the rules is never lost sight of and it is understood that the rules might be impermanent and subject to exceptions. This is more along the lines of a set of rules as shortcuts to follow rather than trying to do the calculations. In fact this is probably what already occurs in real life. We teach children rules like “don’t lie” because they generally work, although children will certainly encounter an exceptional case sooner or later. The idea of natural rights could be thought of as a “rule” because it generally tends to promote utility. Natural rights, though, illustrate the problem of establishing rules because the idea has become such a strong force in political philosophy that it is often justified as a moral principle itself.
Monday, April 02, 2007
On Nationalism
Nationalism is the result of the disintegration of smaller social units (clans, villages). We are altruistic where it serves our own interest, and initially in human civilization, it is small groups like rural villages or nomadic tribes that help us as individuals to survive. But when social and economic forces moved people to the cities, to the factories, to the armies that now required larger numbers of men and operations on a much larger scale to be effective (no longer a feudal lord and his band of knights), the cohesion with one's original small social group is then made to expand to that of the much larger social unit as people are more tied in to that unit for survival and as warlords use the language of nationalism to cement that social cohesion to achieve their military and political ends. For centuries, loyalty needed only to extend to family that shared genetic information and neighbors whose cooperation ensured survival. But the administrative and political necessities of that acompanied expansion of a leader's personal power expanded those bonds of loyalty to encompass the larger group that shared some ethnic, linguistic, and cultural characteristics, those similarities being useful tools in the molding of a new and larger powerbase. The printing press, standardization of spelling and dialect, increased literacy, a professional bureaucracy, and an economy of a much greater scope solidified that powerbase.
Nevertheless, nationalism is an impurity still found in most people's ethical repertoire. Perhaps an international economy, world-wide web, and possibly a world government can extend further bonds of loyalty to encompass all mankind and beyond.
Nevertheless, nationalism is an impurity still found in most people's ethical repertoire. Perhaps an international economy, world-wide web, and possibly a world government can extend further bonds of loyalty to encompass all mankind and beyond.
Friday, February 02, 2007
Why the categorical imperative is useful
Though I tend to favor the utilitarian viewpoint, there is something to be said for Kantian ethics. While utilitarianism offers a logical, calculating approach, the categorical imperative seems in its simplicity to cut right to the heart of the matter without need of a utility balance sheet. It asks us to consider whether a maxim could be acted on while at the same time it should be desirable for universal application. An individual may want to steal, but if stealing were universally accepted, he too would be liable to being stolen from, resulting in the contradiction of simultaneously approving of the concept of stealing while not approving of the real sense of loss resulting from being stolen from. The categorical imperative is an effective tool because it translates into a more logical approach something that happens normally on an emotional level. We empathize with others. This happens because our brains actually simulate our best estimate of the situation another person is in. When we see someone suffering, our brain actually “plays out” the scenario of the same kind of suffering the other person is experiencing. This in turn produces an emotional response, the same emotional response the person who is actually suffering undergoes (assuming our brain is not functioning abnormally, as with some mental disorders, or our ability to put ourselves in others “shoes” is not inhibited by learned cultural prejudices). We therefore deem the spectacle of the suffering person to be “bad” because of our negative emotional response to it. Rules like “do unto others” and the categorical imperative are ways of explicating abstractly what would happen emotionally in specific instances. In this sense, many of these deontological ethical systems do a better job of explaining how our common sense ethical judgement actually works. Does this mean that utilitarianism should be abandoned? I believe not. The problem with our ability to empathize is that it only works for one person (or animal, or even inanimate object, or a conglomerate representation of a large group of people, such as a nation or culture) at a time. It is possible to empathize with either the oppressor or the oppressed. Typically, we can better identify with people who are similar to us in sex, race, age, culture, or other qualities, and therefore we are more apt to empathize with them. True, as long as these prejudices to not slant our view inordinately, we tend to empathize more with the oppressed, probably because their degree of suffering is usually much more intense than the degree of happiness of the oppressor. However, pure empathy with one individual does not take into consideration the entire scope of a situation with moral weight. In cases where parties involved are not so clearly identifiable as cruel oppressor and suffering victim, a fair assessment of a moral dilemma requires more than simply taking one side or the other. In cases where one person is hurt substantially, while the happiness gained is spread among a large number of people, we naturally empathize with the single sufferer. Yet we probably do feel a sense that this individual should not trump a large group of people. This is why utilitarianism is a more objective, and I feel, better ethical system. While we may not be able to quantify and calculate gains and losses in happiness within each individual involved, this is in theory what should be done to determine the moral course of action. In a practical sense, utilitarianism asks us to examine and empathize with every individual involved, record our feelings about each, and with our best judgement come up with a rough estimate of total net gain or loss in happiness. Yes the estimate will often be very rough, but it considers all viewpoints, and forces us to try to empathize with those who may be very different from ourselves.
…………………………
Deontological rules generally work fine, but every now and then the unpredictable universe throws us a curveball. Particular situations may stretch the limits of such rules, and it is at this point that the categorical imperative and our natural emotional response part ways. We may condemn stealing as a rule, but what if a particular instance of stealing would in fact save lives or make more individuals happy? It seems here we would follow the “emotional imperative” instead. At another point, utilitarianism also departs from the emotional imperative, that is, when we empathize with only one or some of the parties involved in a dilemma. I would argue that logically it is better to “leave” the emotional imperative behind because in that instant our ability to empathize is limited. Unless we really can calculate the utility values, we do not so much leave empathy behind as expand it and apply it to everyone. In this sense, utilitarianism is an extended application of this natural judgement ability. Despite the strength and elegance of the categorical imperative, I still prefer the utility balance sheet.
A note on judgement—I also prefer the British spelling of judgment, instead of judgment. The ‘g’ in the middle without the ‘e’ as a partner makes me sad. So yeah, I like spelling it “wrong” despite the spell-checker’s attempts to change it.
…………………………
Deontological rules generally work fine, but every now and then the unpredictable universe throws us a curveball. Particular situations may stretch the limits of such rules, and it is at this point that the categorical imperative and our natural emotional response part ways. We may condemn stealing as a rule, but what if a particular instance of stealing would in fact save lives or make more individuals happy? It seems here we would follow the “emotional imperative” instead. At another point, utilitarianism also departs from the emotional imperative, that is, when we empathize with only one or some of the parties involved in a dilemma. I would argue that logically it is better to “leave” the emotional imperative behind because in that instant our ability to empathize is limited. Unless we really can calculate the utility values, we do not so much leave empathy behind as expand it and apply it to everyone. In this sense, utilitarianism is an extended application of this natural judgement ability. Despite the strength and elegance of the categorical imperative, I still prefer the utility balance sheet.
A note on judgement—I also prefer the British spelling of judgment, instead of judgment. The ‘g’ in the middle without the ‘e’ as a partner makes me sad. So yeah, I like spelling it “wrong” despite the spell-checker’s attempts to change it.
Saturday, January 06, 2007
A Utilitarian Theory of Justice
Justice is a concept that often defies definition, and there are many conceptions of it. A libertarian view emphasizes freedom from coercion, while distributive or social justice seeks equality. Here I will use a strictly defined desert theory of justice and try to show how it fits in with a utilitarian ethical system. Justice, as I will define it, is centered on the idea of balance, not necessarily equality, of the distribution of goods. One can obtain something by putting forth the effort with that goal in mind, in which case the individual deserves to gain the intended benefit. Thus inequalities can result based on the behaviors of the individual agents while still maintaining justice. Injustice occurs when goods are not distributed according to desert. Injustice can be positive or negative. Positive injustice occurs when someone obtains a good without having put forth the effort to deserve it. An example of this would be finding a treasure in a field or accidentally striking oil on one’s land. Negative injustice occurs when someone does put forth the effort, but does not obtain the deserved benefit. An example of this is climatic crop failure after a year of working the land. An individual who does nothing deserves neither to gain nor lose, and his status should remain neutral. I believe this definition of justice captures the various intuitive feelings we have about the concept. We do indeed have a sense of social justice, in which we think it unfair that some are born into wealth, while others are born into poverty. In fact, for the world to be completely just, according to my definition, all agents should start out equal in every respect. Since we do not, we rightly have this sense of social injustice in the world. Yet we also have a sense that an individual who has earned a good through effort should not have it taken away to give to others who have not made the effort. When we consider justice to concern the starting conditions of all agents in the moral community, this definition of justice captures both intuitive senses of justice fairly well.
If justice is a desert-based system for distributing goods, then what constitutes these goods? Material wealth, knowledge, possibly certain virtues, or a number of things could be distributed along the lines of desert. Since I am working with a utilitarian theory of ethics, I will consider all these things to be merely incidental to the goal of achieving happiness. Therefore I will consider the ultimate good to be distributed justly to be happiness or utility itself. I will return to this in a moment. For now, I also want to distinguish justice from pure ethics. The goal of utilitarian ethics is to maximize happiness (or utility) for the most individuals. Whatever works to achieve this is considered to be moral. Utilitarianism disregards justice as an end in of itself. In fact, ideally, utility would be distributed along the lines of positive injustice as I described it earlier. Nevertheless, including a sense of justice with utilitarianism can better elucidate the realm of moral experience.
Every event with moral weight involves at least one agent. Such events will have consequences involving both utility and justice. An event with moral weight involving only one agent occurs when impersonal forces at play in the universe cause some change in utility to an individual. He may become more happy or less happy, and by that criterion we can judge the event to be good or bad. At the same time, that increase in happiness can be deserved or undeserved, and thus be unjust, either positively or negatively so. Events involving one or more agents acting on one or more other agents become more complex, as it is necessary to consider the changes in utility and justice status for both. In carrying out the action, the acting agent has an expectation of how it will change the level of utility in himself and in the agent that he is acting on. (Note: It has been suggested that all agents expect their actions to increase their own utility, that is, to want to do something means that one inherently believes doing so will make one happier. Since this theory is non-falsifiable, I will assume that it is at least theoretically possible for an agent to carry out an action that he believes will actually decrease his utility.) There are also to be considered the actual changes in utility in the acting agent and the affected agent. Sometimes there may also be a secondary event wherein the acting agent perceives the reaction of the affected agent, which in turn could change the level of his own utility. Let us consider each part individually.
When the acting agent derives utility from the event at an amount different than what he expected to derive from it, it is because he had imperfect knowledge of the situation. This imperfect knowledge can be attributed to a bundle of causal chains emanating from the beginning of the universe and snaking in an out of his being. I will better explain that statement later. For now, it is sufficient to say that the universe is responsible for the discrepancy. This difference is the level of injustice of utility that the acting agent now has with regard to the universe. It is positive injustice if he gained more utility than he expected, and negative injustice if he gained less than expected. Negative or positive injustice is also applicable if he expected to lose utility in carrying out the action (suppose carrying it out involved considerable physical strain, for instance). It can be said that he now owes the universe a measure of utility, or that the universe owes him, for this discrepancy.
As for the affected agent, the event may cause a change in utility within himself. If he gains utility, it can be said that he has incurred “utility debt” to the acting agent, since he was immediately responsible for the event. If he has instead suffered as a result, and therefore has lost utility, then the acting agent has incurred “utility debt”, which he now owes. I believe this concept of utility debt captures the spirit of the obligation an individual often feels to do something positive for another person who has benefited him. However, there is more to it. One criticism of utilitarianism is that it takes no consideration of intentions. By taking the concept of utility justice one step further, I believe it is possible to address this. One must remember that the acting agent may also have an expectation of the change in the level of utility of the affected agent. To expect that it will increase is to have good intentions, to expect it to decrease is to have bad intentions, and to have no expectations is to have no intention with regard to morals. When the affected agent’s utility is changed by the event, there may be a discrepancy between the expected effect and the actual effect. Because the acting agent sought to change the affected agent’s utility only to the level he expected, that is the level of desert the acting agent has as regards the actualization of the event, and therefore that is the amount of utility debt incurred. The difference between the expected level of utility and the actual level also represent a utility debt. However, this debt is incurred by the universe, since it was impersonal unforeseen forces in the universe that were responsible for the discrepancy. Perhaps breaking it down makes this clearer. Suppose an acting agent expects his action to cause and increase of three hedons (theoretical units of pleasure—as of yet we cannot truly quantify it) of utility in the affected agent, but the actual level of utility increases by five hedons. The affected agent now has a utility debt to the acting agent, but only as much as the acting agent anticipated the increase in utility to be. The remaining two hedons are the responsibility of the universe, and so those fall into the category of a sort of “karmic debt” owed by the affected agent to the universe. The formula is simply expected utility minus actual utility equal karmic debt (or credit). In this case, 3h – 5h = -2h. If the expected increase in utility was less than the actual, then the affected agent owes the expected amount to the acting agent, but the universe in turn owes the affected agent the difference (5h – 3h = 2h in karmic credit owed by the universe to the affected agent). If the actual change in utility was exactly what was expected, then nothing is owed the universe. Suppose the acting agent’s intent was actually to decrease the level of utility for the affected agent (bad intentions). In the case where the expectation was a large decrease in utility but the reality was a smaller decrease, the same formula applies, only now it is the acting agent who owes the affected agent, with the difference being owed the universe by the affected agent: (-5)h – (-3)h = -2h. If the utility in the affected agent decreased more than was expected, then the difference is owed by the universe to the affected agent: (-3)h – (-5)h = 2h in karmic credit.
I justify this hedonistic calculus because we do have a sense that intention matters in some way on ethical matters, yet in a purely utilitarian sense, it does not matter. We do not treat accidental manslaughter the same way as murder in a court of law, yet we recognize the very real suffering caused by a death in both cases. The idea of the universe owing utility debt to us or that we might somehow owe utility debt to the universe may at first sound absurd. Yet, we can feel angry at the world in general or at no one in particular because of unfortunate circumstances we happen to be in. Likewise, we have the idea of luck, that is, favorable circumstances that we cannot attribute to any particular person. Though it is only by luck that we could ever hope to be repaid by the universe and we can never actually repay the universe what we owe, the concept of the universe as a debtor or creditor captures the reality of our experience and helps clarify degrees of responsibility. I justify dividing responsibility for the gain or loss in utility between the acting agent and the universe at the point of expected change from a compatibilist view of determinism. All events, including those commonly attributed to free will by acting agents, are, in reality, determined by the laws of physics. Robust free will is an incoherent concept and could not exist in the world as we know it. However, it is difficult to build a system of ethics upon a deterministic universe. Therefore it is helpful to draw the line at some point where the chains of cause and effect are largely contained within an individual mind and attribute moral responsibility to actions originating primarily from within that mind. It is ultimately arbitrary where that line is drawn, since everything making up an individual’s mind eventually originates from causes outside his being. Genetics, environment, and upbringing are just a few of the groupings of billions of chains of cause and effect to which we often attribute the actions of an individual. There may be something we call a will, but it is not free. The brain is a decision-making machine, but can only make decisions based on the information that is available to it and its choices are limited by its own inherent ability and immediate circumstances. Nevertheless, it works the best it can using imperfect knowledge. I work with the assumption that if the acting agent had known all the forces at work in the event and had a perfectly rational mind, then the actual result of his actions would be exactly what he expected. Therefore any discrepancy between the two is the result of forces in the universe of which the acting agent had insufficient knowledge and/or preconditions in the mind to which we cannot hold the agent accountable, or, in short, the universe itself.
There are some consequences and caveats if we accept this view of justice and utility. One is that an acting agent also may or may not receive feedback from the affected agent as to his change in utility. The perception of a discrepancy between intended and actual change may itself cause changes in the utility of the acting agent. There may also be several related actions in quick succession. In order to determine by whom and to whom utility debt is owed, it may be necessary to break down the whole series of actions into individual actions to see where debt is incurred and where it is cancelled out. There are also implications in regard to the idea of punishment and reward. From a utilitarian standpoint, I think it is best to resist the urge to advocate any kind of punishment by converting lost hedons into dolors (units of pain). Repaying lost hedons with dolors, as in the case of punishing an acting agent may in a sense cancel his utility debt to the affected agent (thus eliminating injustice between the two agents), but only if no other agent is involved in carrying out the punishment. Punishment in of itself also does nothing to restore lost utility (utility has decreased in both parties, but equally), nor does it recognize whatever debt or credit the universe may have. In any case, it is the goal of utilitarianism to increase utility regardless of justice. It is only because recognition of injustice (a sense of unfairness in the world and in the deeds of others) incidentally has the effect of often decreasing utility that feel a need to place it somewhere in the realm of ethics. With the system I have described, we can recognize its role in ethics. Individuals who have earned utility credit from increasing the utility of others have a right or a just claim to more utility, while those who have done the opposite are ones on whom others have a just claim to demand that they increase their utility. It is only necessary from a purely ethical standpoint to recognize justice inasmuch as satisfying justice tends to lead to utility whereas injustice tends to lead to less utility.
There is one type of person who is best suited to live in the ethical realm. It is one who forgives any utility debt owed to him by others or by the universe, and who gains utility from increasing the utility of others. Such a saint would always try to increase the happiness of others and in doing so make himself happier, while at the same time never being saddened by things that would normally cause one to be unhappy. This altruistic stoic is one whom we should all strive to emulate.
If justice is a desert-based system for distributing goods, then what constitutes these goods? Material wealth, knowledge, possibly certain virtues, or a number of things could be distributed along the lines of desert. Since I am working with a utilitarian theory of ethics, I will consider all these things to be merely incidental to the goal of achieving happiness. Therefore I will consider the ultimate good to be distributed justly to be happiness or utility itself. I will return to this in a moment. For now, I also want to distinguish justice from pure ethics. The goal of utilitarian ethics is to maximize happiness (or utility) for the most individuals. Whatever works to achieve this is considered to be moral. Utilitarianism disregards justice as an end in of itself. In fact, ideally, utility would be distributed along the lines of positive injustice as I described it earlier. Nevertheless, including a sense of justice with utilitarianism can better elucidate the realm of moral experience.
Every event with moral weight involves at least one agent. Such events will have consequences involving both utility and justice. An event with moral weight involving only one agent occurs when impersonal forces at play in the universe cause some change in utility to an individual. He may become more happy or less happy, and by that criterion we can judge the event to be good or bad. At the same time, that increase in happiness can be deserved or undeserved, and thus be unjust, either positively or negatively so. Events involving one or more agents acting on one or more other agents become more complex, as it is necessary to consider the changes in utility and justice status for both. In carrying out the action, the acting agent has an expectation of how it will change the level of utility in himself and in the agent that he is acting on. (Note: It has been suggested that all agents expect their actions to increase their own utility, that is, to want to do something means that one inherently believes doing so will make one happier. Since this theory is non-falsifiable, I will assume that it is at least theoretically possible for an agent to carry out an action that he believes will actually decrease his utility.) There are also to be considered the actual changes in utility in the acting agent and the affected agent. Sometimes there may also be a secondary event wherein the acting agent perceives the reaction of the affected agent, which in turn could change the level of his own utility. Let us consider each part individually.
When the acting agent derives utility from the event at an amount different than what he expected to derive from it, it is because he had imperfect knowledge of the situation. This imperfect knowledge can be attributed to a bundle of causal chains emanating from the beginning of the universe and snaking in an out of his being. I will better explain that statement later. For now, it is sufficient to say that the universe is responsible for the discrepancy. This difference is the level of injustice of utility that the acting agent now has with regard to the universe. It is positive injustice if he gained more utility than he expected, and negative injustice if he gained less than expected. Negative or positive injustice is also applicable if he expected to lose utility in carrying out the action (suppose carrying it out involved considerable physical strain, for instance). It can be said that he now owes the universe a measure of utility, or that the universe owes him, for this discrepancy.
As for the affected agent, the event may cause a change in utility within himself. If he gains utility, it can be said that he has incurred “utility debt” to the acting agent, since he was immediately responsible for the event. If he has instead suffered as a result, and therefore has lost utility, then the acting agent has incurred “utility debt”, which he now owes. I believe this concept of utility debt captures the spirit of the obligation an individual often feels to do something positive for another person who has benefited him. However, there is more to it. One criticism of utilitarianism is that it takes no consideration of intentions. By taking the concept of utility justice one step further, I believe it is possible to address this. One must remember that the acting agent may also have an expectation of the change in the level of utility of the affected agent. To expect that it will increase is to have good intentions, to expect it to decrease is to have bad intentions, and to have no expectations is to have no intention with regard to morals. When the affected agent’s utility is changed by the event, there may be a discrepancy between the expected effect and the actual effect. Because the acting agent sought to change the affected agent’s utility only to the level he expected, that is the level of desert the acting agent has as regards the actualization of the event, and therefore that is the amount of utility debt incurred. The difference between the expected level of utility and the actual level also represent a utility debt. However, this debt is incurred by the universe, since it was impersonal unforeseen forces in the universe that were responsible for the discrepancy. Perhaps breaking it down makes this clearer. Suppose an acting agent expects his action to cause and increase of three hedons (theoretical units of pleasure—as of yet we cannot truly quantify it) of utility in the affected agent, but the actual level of utility increases by five hedons. The affected agent now has a utility debt to the acting agent, but only as much as the acting agent anticipated the increase in utility to be. The remaining two hedons are the responsibility of the universe, and so those fall into the category of a sort of “karmic debt” owed by the affected agent to the universe. The formula is simply expected utility minus actual utility equal karmic debt (or credit). In this case, 3h – 5h = -2h. If the expected increase in utility was less than the actual, then the affected agent owes the expected amount to the acting agent, but the universe in turn owes the affected agent the difference (5h – 3h = 2h in karmic credit owed by the universe to the affected agent). If the actual change in utility was exactly what was expected, then nothing is owed the universe. Suppose the acting agent’s intent was actually to decrease the level of utility for the affected agent (bad intentions). In the case where the expectation was a large decrease in utility but the reality was a smaller decrease, the same formula applies, only now it is the acting agent who owes the affected agent, with the difference being owed the universe by the affected agent: (-5)h – (-3)h = -2h. If the utility in the affected agent decreased more than was expected, then the difference is owed by the universe to the affected agent: (-3)h – (-5)h = 2h in karmic credit.
I justify this hedonistic calculus because we do have a sense that intention matters in some way on ethical matters, yet in a purely utilitarian sense, it does not matter. We do not treat accidental manslaughter the same way as murder in a court of law, yet we recognize the very real suffering caused by a death in both cases. The idea of the universe owing utility debt to us or that we might somehow owe utility debt to the universe may at first sound absurd. Yet, we can feel angry at the world in general or at no one in particular because of unfortunate circumstances we happen to be in. Likewise, we have the idea of luck, that is, favorable circumstances that we cannot attribute to any particular person. Though it is only by luck that we could ever hope to be repaid by the universe and we can never actually repay the universe what we owe, the concept of the universe as a debtor or creditor captures the reality of our experience and helps clarify degrees of responsibility. I justify dividing responsibility for the gain or loss in utility between the acting agent and the universe at the point of expected change from a compatibilist view of determinism. All events, including those commonly attributed to free will by acting agents, are, in reality, determined by the laws of physics. Robust free will is an incoherent concept and could not exist in the world as we know it. However, it is difficult to build a system of ethics upon a deterministic universe. Therefore it is helpful to draw the line at some point where the chains of cause and effect are largely contained within an individual mind and attribute moral responsibility to actions originating primarily from within that mind. It is ultimately arbitrary where that line is drawn, since everything making up an individual’s mind eventually originates from causes outside his being. Genetics, environment, and upbringing are just a few of the groupings of billions of chains of cause and effect to which we often attribute the actions of an individual. There may be something we call a will, but it is not free. The brain is a decision-making machine, but can only make decisions based on the information that is available to it and its choices are limited by its own inherent ability and immediate circumstances. Nevertheless, it works the best it can using imperfect knowledge. I work with the assumption that if the acting agent had known all the forces at work in the event and had a perfectly rational mind, then the actual result of his actions would be exactly what he expected. Therefore any discrepancy between the two is the result of forces in the universe of which the acting agent had insufficient knowledge and/or preconditions in the mind to which we cannot hold the agent accountable, or, in short, the universe itself.
There are some consequences and caveats if we accept this view of justice and utility. One is that an acting agent also may or may not receive feedback from the affected agent as to his change in utility. The perception of a discrepancy between intended and actual change may itself cause changes in the utility of the acting agent. There may also be several related actions in quick succession. In order to determine by whom and to whom utility debt is owed, it may be necessary to break down the whole series of actions into individual actions to see where debt is incurred and where it is cancelled out. There are also implications in regard to the idea of punishment and reward. From a utilitarian standpoint, I think it is best to resist the urge to advocate any kind of punishment by converting lost hedons into dolors (units of pain). Repaying lost hedons with dolors, as in the case of punishing an acting agent may in a sense cancel his utility debt to the affected agent (thus eliminating injustice between the two agents), but only if no other agent is involved in carrying out the punishment. Punishment in of itself also does nothing to restore lost utility (utility has decreased in both parties, but equally), nor does it recognize whatever debt or credit the universe may have. In any case, it is the goal of utilitarianism to increase utility regardless of justice. It is only because recognition of injustice (a sense of unfairness in the world and in the deeds of others) incidentally has the effect of often decreasing utility that feel a need to place it somewhere in the realm of ethics. With the system I have described, we can recognize its role in ethics. Individuals who have earned utility credit from increasing the utility of others have a right or a just claim to more utility, while those who have done the opposite are ones on whom others have a just claim to demand that they increase their utility. It is only necessary from a purely ethical standpoint to recognize justice inasmuch as satisfying justice tends to lead to utility whereas injustice tends to lead to less utility.
There is one type of person who is best suited to live in the ethical realm. It is one who forgives any utility debt owed to him by others or by the universe, and who gains utility from increasing the utility of others. Such a saint would always try to increase the happiness of others and in doing so make himself happier, while at the same time never being saddened by things that would normally cause one to be unhappy. This altruistic stoic is one whom we should all strive to emulate.
Saturday, December 16, 2006
States' Rights are Bullshit
Many Americans, particularly in the South, are quite found of the concept of “states’ rights.” For those living under unitary systems who are unfamiliar with the American federal system, here goes a quick bit of background. During the American Revolt, the various colonies tried to unite into a something like single political entity. With each colony having been accustomed to governing itself, many were reluctant to give up their local power to a higher level of government. After much debate, the 10th Amendment was added to clarify the relationship between the federal, or higher-level government, and the governments of the new 13 states. It says that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The concept makes sense in that different geographic regions will likely have different needs unique to the area and that legislative bodies within those regions would be best able to enact measure to handle those needs. It also means that the federal government does not always have to waste time micromanaging the various regions in the country. However, traditionally the 10th Amendment has served as an umbrella to all sorts of crazy state laws and state constitutional amendments that violate basic human rights. It has been used to try to do things like preserve slavery, protect institutional racism, avoid environmental protection regulations, and persecute homosexuals. To allow state legislatures free reign over broad, sweeping issues concerning basic human rights is to allow for the creation of a patchwork nation where some states violate human rights while others preserve them. While traveling across the nation, a racial minority may find that he suddenly isn’t granted equal protection under the law or a gay couple may find their marriage vows invalidated upon moving to a new state. While the federal government can get things wrong as well (such as in the case of many drug laws), the power of the state legislatures should be limited to the realm of fishing licenses and parking tickets, not fundamental human rights. A woman’s right over her own body or racial equality shouldn’t be concepts inimical to humanity everywhere in the universe except in Mississippi. Yet, as shown by the recent passage of several state constitutional amendments banning gay marriage, the danger still exists for crackpot bigots and religious extremists to use the 10th Amendment to impose their own disgusting value systems on others. If they cannot control the nation, they at least want to control their little racist fiefdom.
Ultimately (and here’s where I go off on a tangent, spouting off about radical idealistic utopias), the entire would should be governed by something like the federal system. Currently existing national governments should become something analogous to our state governments (and perhaps a few large countries should be broken up into several smaller oblasts or perhaps geographic regions), handling matters of local significance, but never being allowed to violate the principles of human equality and basic human rights we’ve so slowly and painfully come to recognize.
Ultimately (and here’s where I go off on a tangent, spouting off about radical idealistic utopias), the entire would should be governed by something like the federal system. Currently existing national governments should become something analogous to our state governments (and perhaps a few large countries should be broken up into several smaller oblasts or perhaps geographic regions), handling matters of local significance, but never being allowed to violate the principles of human equality and basic human rights we’ve so slowly and painfully come to recognize.
Thursday, August 03, 2006
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)