Against Rule Utilitarianism

Here’s why I think act utilitarianism is better than rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism assumes that: (1) in most cases a rule maximizes utility and (2) in exceptional cases wherein the rule does not maximize utility, the rule should be followed because: (a) people may not realize the exceptional nature of a particular case and cite the incident as a precedent for breaking the rule generally and (b) reinforcement of the rule in the long run maximizes utility more than breaking the rule in exceptional cases. A and B are arguable. Reasonable people should be able to recognize extreme situations that test the limits of such rules. It is also conceivable that at some point circumstances might change enough so that some of the rules no longer maximize utility. Act utilitarianism, I believe covers the same ground as rule utilitarianism because the consequences of an example of breaking a “rule” would be taken into consideration in the utility calculations. Act utilitarianism remains true to the consequentialist basis of utilitarianism (that consequences are what matters) without establishing any hard and fast rules that might become so ingrained in the conscience that the system of rules itself replaces the notion of utility as the basis for morals. A weak or “provisional” form of rule utilitarianism might be acceptable so long as the consequentialist basis of the rules is never lost sight of and it is understood that the rules might be impermanent and subject to exceptions. This is more along the lines of a set of rules as shortcuts to follow rather than trying to do the calculations. In fact this is probably what already occurs in real life. We teach children rules like “don’t lie” because they generally work, although children will certainly encounter an exceptional case sooner or later. The idea of natural rights could be thought of as a “rule” because it generally tends to promote utility. Natural rights, though, illustrate the problem of establishing rules because the idea has become such a strong force in political philosophy that it is often justified as a moral principle itself.